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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 90 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 11/06/1997 
Where it occurred: Chawni Village, Ali 
Khail District, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
request for long handtool (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for four years. It was three months since he had last 
completed a revision course and 43 days since his last leave. The ground where the accident 
occurred was described as a hard and bushy hillside beside a river. A photograph showed 
small green "bushes" that were 60cm (2') high. The ground appeared to be largely shale and 
small stones.  
The investigators determined that the victim was working in a bushy clearance lane with 
continuous detector readings. Because of the continuous reading, he was digging all of the 
area and prodded with excessive force and let off a PMN. They identified the device by "found 
fragments". The victim believing that he had touched a tripwire with his bayonet. 
The Team Leader said that the deminer was working properly and the mine may have been 
tilted. He added that a modern detector that could differentiate close readings would reduce 
accidents. 
The Section Leader said the victim was working properly and that the mine must have been 
on its side. He said greater caution, and greater control from the victim's partner, might 
reduce the number of accidents. 
The victim's partner said he was working properly, but that the mines were up to 50cm deep 
and had changed position. 
The victim said he was prodding and working properly. He was not wearing a fragmentation 
vest because the team did not have enough. He states that his bayonet pulled a tripwire and 
let off a booby trap. He recommended using a long Russian bayonet for prodding. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that either the deminer was squatting to prod and prodded at the 
wrong angle or the mine had been placed during floods and was at an angle in the ground. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers must avoid applying excessive force; that 
greater care is needed where mines have been moved by floods because their orientation is 
uncertain; that the command group should ensure all safety procedures are adhered to; and 
that all deminers should wear fragmentation jackets when unable to probe prone. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 121 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 300,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 















See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: amputation of right hand at the wrist, deep right 
chest injury (subclavicular 4-5cm), superficial wounds on left hand, both shoulders, his neck 
and his "thighs".  
A sketch showed abrasions to his knees, body, left arm and hand and a fragment hole in his 
chest.  
A photograph showed upper body injuries and right hand amputation. 
The demining group reported that the victim suffered: amputation right forearm (which was 
"crushed"),  fracture right clavicle and left hand 4th metacarpal, breathing difficulty and a chest 
penetration. They reported two months later that the stump had healed, but his left hand and 
right shoulder were stiff. His injuries were assessed as a 60% disability. Another document 
described his injuries as: traumatic amputation of right hand at wrist, deep chest injury 
(subclavicular to 5cm), lacerated wounds to left hand, both shoulders, neck and both legs. 
Compensation of 300,000 Rs was forwarded on 6th November 1997. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Unavoidable" because it seems likely that 
the victim was working appropriately (within his group's SOPs) when the accident occurred.  
The failure of the demining group to provide appropriate detectors, protective equipment or 
excavating tools are significant management failings. Use of the short bayonet almost 
certainly resulted in more severe injuries than would have occurred with a long tool, and it 
seems likely that the chest penetration was caused by a part of the bayonet or its handle (see 
accident in Afghanistan on 30th December 1990). The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate equipment”. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" without wearing a frag-jacket was in breach of 
UN requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements.  The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP 
for local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
Their failure to have provided more than two frag-jackets per team made adherence to their 
rules impossible. 
3 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
 
Related papers 
The picture below shows a Russian prod held in numbers at the training centre for Afghan 
deminers but not used. It is likely that this was to the tool requested. The spectacle-case 
alongside illustrates the scale of the tool. The prod at the end can be reversed and stored 
inside the handle. The handle can be used at various lengths, including very short. 
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